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ABSTRACT 
 
Objectives:  This study examines the influence of collective strain on support for violent 
extremism among an ethnically diverse sample of Swiss adolescents. This study explores 
two claims derived from General Strain Theory: (1) exposure to collective strain is 
associated with higher support for violent extremism and (2) the effect of collective strain 
is conditional on perceptions of moral and legal constraints. 
 
Methods: This study uses data from two waves of the Zurich Project on the Social 
Development of Children and Youth. We use ordinary least squares procedures to regress 
violent extremist attitudes at age 17 on strain, moral and legal constraints, and control 
variables measured at ages 15-17. Conditional effects were examined using an interaction 
term for collective strain and moral neutralization and legal cynicism, respectively. 
  
Results: The results show that collective strain does not have a direct effect on violent 
extremist attitudes once other variables are controlled. However, the degree to which 
individuals neutralize moral and legal constraints amplifies the impact of collective strain 
on violent extremist attitudes. 
 
Conclusions: This study shows that those who already espouse justifications for violence 
and rule-breaking are more vulnerable to extremist violent pathways, particularly when 
exposed to collective social strife, conflict, and repression. 
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Research on violent extremism has produced a wide array of risk factors in psychological, 
social, and political domains (Bhui, Warfa, and Jones 2014; Borum 2011a, 2011b; 
Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Gill, Horgan, and Deckert 2014; LaFree and Ackerman 2009; 
McGilloway, Ghosh, and Bhui 2015). These include psychological characteristics (e.g. low 
self-control), social context features (e.g. alienation) and political processes (e.g. exclusion 
from politics). LaFree and Ackerman (2009) argue that part of the difficulty in 
synthesizing information on extremist violence is due to the breadth of attitudinal, 
behavioral, and group-based outcomes examined under one conceptual umbrella. In 
addition, studies differ in their analytical approach, including for instance analyses of risk 
factors using survey samples and individual interviews (Doosje, Loseman, and van den 
Bos 2013; Goli and Rezaei 2010; Pauwels and De Waele 2014), or retrospective life 
history analyses of known terrorists (Gill et al. 2014). As a result of this diversity in 
theoretical domains, outcomes, and analytical approaches, empirical findings on the 
causes and correlates of violent extremist beliefs and behaviors are understandably mixed. 
In light of this, Freilich and LaFree (2015) call for a better integration of terrorism 
and extremism research into broader criminological theory and analysis (see also Agnew 
2010; Schils and Pauwels 2014). Following this call the present paper examines the 
interplay between two potentially fruitful theoretical approaches to violent extremism, 
namely strain theories and neutralization theories. Strain theories such as Agnew’s 
General Strain Theory predict that support for violent extremism is more likely when 
collective strain is experienced, such as perceived discrimination against a group one 
identifies with, feelings of injustice, or vicarious or direct trauma from war and civil strife 
(Agnew 2010; Bhui et al. 2014; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Hagan, Merkens, and Boehnke 
1995; LaFree and Ackerman 2009; Pauwels and De Waele 2014; Weine et al. 2009). 
Neutralization theories predict that support for violent extremism is higher when actors 
morally disengage from ethical standards that prohibit violence or when they legally 
disengage from the obligation to comply with the law (Bandura 1986; Ribeaud and Eisner 
2010; Nivette et al. 2015; Rattner and Yagil 2004). These theories are not mutually 
exclusive. Rather, collective strain as a structural feature and neutralization as a 
psychological process may mutually reinforce each other (Mazerolle and Maahs 2000). 
This paper therefore examines a core prediction of strain theory, namely that support for 
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violent extremism should be particularly high when experiences of collective strain are 
coupled with psychological mechanisms of moral and legal neutralization.  
We investigate these hypotheses with data from the Zurich Project on the Social 
Development of Children and Youth (z-proso). This is a cohort study of an ethnically and 
religiously mixed sample of adolescents in Zurich, Switzerland, where support for violent 
extremism was measured at age 17. A large proportion of study participants’ parents 
immigrated from fragile and conflict-torn societies, making the sample particularly 
relevant for examining the stipulated mechanisms. Z-proso is one of very few studies 
worldwide that can prospectively examine the developmental mechanisms associated with 
the formation of violent extremist attitudes during late adolescence. Furthermore, at the 
time of the data collection (2013/2014) Switzerland's level of exposure to terrorism was 
estimated to be roughly in line with that of other Western societies. According to the 
2013 Global Terrorism Index Report, Switzerland was ranked 72 among 162 countries, 
comparable to the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Germany or Canada, but lower than the 
United States (ranked 33).1 The annual reports by the Swiss National Intelligence Service 
suggest a small group of fundamentalist Islamic actors, with a total of approximately 80 
fighters who joined ISIS over the past decade.  The reports also note about 130 incidents 
of violent acts committed by left-wing or right-wing extremists per year, with a declining 
tendency since 2011 (Nachrichtendienst des Bundes, 2015).  
Violent extremist attitudes are defined here as attitudes that “encourage, endorse, 
condone, justify, or support the commission of a violent criminal act to achieve political, 
ideological, religious, social, or economic goals” (International Association of Chiefs of 
Police [IACP] 2014). We note that the relationship between extremist beliefs and actual 
terrorist activities is poorly understood. A number of conceptualizations of the extremist 
value-acquisition process portray the pathways to violent extremist behaviors in a 
stepwise fashion (see Borum’s [2011a] review). In these models, pro-extremist attitudes 
are typically acquired in the “early” stages among a wider sample of the population, 
whereas engaging in extremist acts occurs among a much smaller proportion of those 
with favorable attitudes at a “later” stage (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008). Robust 
evidence in delinquency research demonstrates the substantial link between attitudes, 
                                                          
1 The 2013 Global Terrorism Index is available at http://162.243.170.40/#page/indexes/terrorism-
index/2013. 
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behavioral intentions and behaviors as suggested by Fishbein and Aizen (1975). More 
specifically, delinquent attitudes have been shown to be longitudinally predictive of 
delinquent behavior intentions, although behavior also affects subsequent attitudes 
(Rebellion, Manasse, Van Gundy, and Cohn, 2014; Thornberry, Lizotte, Krohn, 
Farnworth, and Jang, 1994; Zhang, Loeber, and Southamer-Loeber, 1997). However, the 
relationship is complex as some violent extremists and terrorists have been found to have 
limited “radical beliefs” (e.g. Simi, Sporer, and Bubolz 2016), and actors with high levels 
of support for violent political strategies may never engage in violence themselves 
(Wikström and Bouhana in press). As such, only a tiny fraction of those with extremist 
attitudes engage in politically motivated violence, and researchers have documented a 
wide range of potential mechanisms that mobilize individuals or groups from belief to 
action (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008; Simi et al., 2016). Therefore it is likely that the 
development of beliefs and attitudes that justify violent political action and involvement 
in terrorist activities are partly influenced by different mechanisms. In this paper we focus 
exclusively on risk factors for individual differences in extremist, violence-condoning 
attitudes.   
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
General Strain Theory 
Generally, strain theories explain criminal attitudes and behaviors as manifestations of 
negative coping in response to adverse events, conditions, or treatment (Agnew 1992, 
2006; Merton 1938). Agnew’s (1992) revised General Strain Theory [GST] aimed to 
improve upon earlier versions of strain theory by expanding the types of negative 
relationships that produce strain, explicating the social-psychological mechanisms that 
underlie the relationship between strain and crime, and examining the conditions under 
which effects of strain may be buffered or amplified (Agnew et al. 2002).  
 Agnew (1992) outlined three types of strain resulting from negative relationships 
with others. First, strain can result when individuals are prevented from achieving their 
goals, which includes relationships or interactions that are perceived as unjust or 
inequitable (Agnew 1992). The second type arises when positively valued stimuli are 
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removed, such as the loss of a parent, romantic partner, or employment. Third, strain can 
result from noxious stimuli such as victimization, child abuse, and negative experiences 
with parents, peers, police, and employers (Agnew 1992; Kalmakis and Chandler 2015). 
Exposure to these strains can produce negative emotions like anger and frustration, which 
demand corrective action (Agnew et al. 2002). According to GST, crime is a type of 
corrective action that seeks to injure, damage, or seek revenge on the presumed sources 
of the strain.  
General strain theory offers a theoretical framework to conceptualize the effects 
of strain on support for violent extremism. In particular, it outlines the types of strain that 
are most relevant for extremist violence, and conditional influences likely to amplify or 
buffer the effects of strain (Agnew 2010). Thus, Agnew (2010) criticizes the broad 
conceptualization of strain used in much terrorism and extremism research. Such 
approaches fail to account for the specific motivations for violent extremism as opposed 
to ordinary crime or deviance. Specifically, he argues that extremist violence is typically 
inflicted on behalf of a social, religious, or political group or ideology. In order to endorse 
violence on behalf of a group or ideology, one must experience collective strain (Agnew 
2010; Piazza 2012). Types of collective strain likely to facilitate the adoption of violent 
extremist beliefs are high in magnitude, considered highly unjust, and caused by more 
powerful political, social, or religious groups (Agnew 2010: 136). 
Prior studies have highlighted a range of strains as potential sources of extremist 
beliefs and behaviors, including adverse childhood experiences (Simi et al. 2016), 
discrimination and feelings of injustice (Goli and Rezaei 2010; Pauwels and De Waele; 
Pauwels and Schils 2016; Piazza 2012), vicarious or direct trauma from war (Bhui et al. 
2014; Weine et al. 2009), and relative deprivation (Freilich et al. 2015). More specifically, 
one key source of collective strain that is often high in magnitude, considered unjust, and 
inflicted by powerful “others” is exposure to political violence, such as conflict, terrorism, 
and war (Canetti et al. 2013; Gill et al. 2014; Hirsch-Hoefler et al. 2014; Muldoon 2013; 
Pedersen 2002; Simi et al. 2016). Prolonged exposure to political violence can act as a 
stressor that leads to anger, anxiety, and depression (Garbarino and Kostelny 1996). 
Studies examining the effect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on support for extremism 
find that both direct and indirect exposure to conflict increases negative emotions and 
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feelings that an individual or group is under threat from the “other” or out-group (Heath 
et al. 2013; Hirsch-Hoefler et al. 2014; Hobfoll et al. 2009; Huesmann et al., in press). 
Hirsch-Hoefler et al. (2014) found that Israelis and Palestinians exposed to political 
violence were more likely to report psychological distress, perceive group threat, and less 
likely to support peaceful means of political conflict resolution.  
Exposure to collective strain need not be direct in order to induce negative 
emotions and corrective action (Agnew 2002; Comer et al. 2007). Agnew (2002: 609) 
argues that vicarious strains can cause distress, increasing the likelihood that individuals 
will seek to “prevent further harm to those they care about, to seek revenge against those 
they believe are responsible for the harm, and/or to alleviate their negative feelings.” 
According to Agnew, vicarious collective strains are more likely to lead to negative coping 
strategies when they are high in magnitude and considered unjust, when they affect 
closely related others, when they are directly witnessed or experienced by the individual, 
when they are unresolved, and seen to be likely to affect the individual. Research generally 
supports the link between vicarious strain – in particular physical victimization – and 
offending behavior (Baron, 2009; Lin, Cochran, and Mieczkowski, 2011; Zavala and 
Spohn, 2013).  
Vicarious collective strains, including indirect exposure to collective physical 
violence, may be particularly salient for second generation immigrant adolescents who 
may feel “culturally homeless” during a key stage in identity formation and consequently 
seek out groups that offer a clear identity and a sense of significance (Lyons-Padilla et al. 
2015: 2). In a review of research on violent radicalization among Muslims in Europe, 
Dalgaard-Nielson (2010) finds that identity-seeking and lack of societal trust increase 
susceptibility to radical or extremist beliefs (see also Doosje, Loseman, and van den Bos 
2013; LaFree and Ackerman 2009; cf. McGilloway et al. 2015).  
 
Moral and Legal Neutralization of Violence 
Scholarship on violent extremism has documented extensively how those who support or 
engage in violent extremism and terrorism disengage from moral, legal, and religious 
standards in order to justify the use of violence against civilians (Aly, Taylor, and 
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Karnovsky 2014; Kruglanski and Fishman 2006; LaFree and Ackerman 2009; Pauwels 
and De Waele 2014; Schils and Pauwels 2014; Slootman and Tille 2006). Psychologically 
these mechanisms serve to overcome barriers to harming others and present an internal 
moral justification for violence. In criminology, such mechanisms are known as 
neutralization processes or cognitive distortions (Ribeaud and Eisner 2010; Sykes and 
Matza, 1957). 
Two such neutralization mechanisms are particularly relevant here, namely moral 
neutralization and legal neutralization. The best-known version of moral neutralization 
theory is moral disengagement theory by Albert Bandura. Bandura (1986, 1999) 
developed a theory to explain engagement in and support for atrocities and violence on 
behalf of a group. The theory predicts that engagement in harmful behavior requires 
disengagement from moral self-sanctions against harmful behavior against others. 
Disengagement processes may “center on redefining harmful conduct as honourable by 
moral justification, exonerating social comparison and sanitising language” (Bandura 
2002: 102). Substantial empirical evidence supports the link between moral 
disengagement or neutralization and aggressive behavior more generally (Fritsche 2005; 
Gini, Pozzoli, and Hymel 2014; Ribeaud and Eisner 2015), as well as between moral 
disengagement and support for political extremism (see Aly et al. 2014; Hafez 2006; 
Pauwels and De Waele 2014; Schils and Pauwels 2014; Slootman and Tille 2006).  
 A related but conceptually distinct mechanism refers to the disengagement from 
the inner obligation to comply with the law, or what Sampson and Bartusch (1998) called 
“legal cynicism.” Legal cynicism refers to attitudes that deny the binding nature of laws 
and that ratify acting in ways that are “outside” of law and social norms (Sampson and 
Bartusch 1998; Nivette et al. 2015). Legal cynicism researchers argue that these attitudes 
arise as an adaptation to persistent experiences of injustice, disadvantage, and alienation 
(Kirk and Papachristos 2011; Sampson and Bartusch 1998). This cynicism “frames” the 
way individuals interpret the law (Kirk and Papachristos 2011) and on the individual level 
can act as a justification for rule-breaking behavior, or legal neutralization (Nivette et al. 
2015). Similar to moral disengagement processes, legal cynicism thus serves as a 
mechanism to delegitimize legal sanctions against violent behaviors. Indeed, there is 
evidence to suggest that legal cynicism is correlated with crime and violence (Fagan and 
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Piquero 2007; Jackson et al. 2012; Kirk and Papachristos 2011; Nivette et al. 2015; 
Sampson and Bartusch 1998; Reisig, Wolfe, and Holtfreter 2011).  
Legal cynicism has also been linked to the use of extra-legal violence to support 
political and ideological goals (Hagan, Kaiser, and Hanson 2016; Rattner and Yagil 2004). 
Hagan et al. (2016) explored the role of legal cynicism in justifying the use of violent 
attacks against state and U.S./Coalition forces in post-invasion Iraq. They argue that 
“cynicism can amplify group experiences and beliefs” which “can lead groups to form 
violent responses to the dilemmas imposed by defeats – whether, for example, these 
defeats follow from concentrated poverty, state repression, or both” (Hagan et al. 2016: 
319). Controlling for other forms of violence, they find that legal cynicism was directly 
related to the use of violence among Arab Sunnis against U.S./Coalition and Iraqi state 
forces.  
 
The interaction between strain and the moral and legal neutralization of violence 
Not all who experience strain cope with crime. Rather, GST specifies several factors that 
condition the effect of strain on criminal coping. This includes, amongst others, 
mechanisms of inner control such as perceived moral and legal restraints or personality 
characteristics such as self-control (Agnew et al. 2002; Hagan et al. 1995; Hobfoll et al. 
2009; Mazerolle and Maahs 2000). For example, Mazerolle and Maahs (2000) found that 
the effects of strain were stronger among individuals with more delinquent peers, high 
propensity to commit crime, and low moral beliefs (see also Agnew and White 1992). 
Similarly, Agnew et al. (2002: 64) found support for the notion that negative emotionality 
and low constraint condition the impact of strain on criminal behavior. An individual’s 
moral constraints and perceptions of legal boundaries and legitimacy can act as internal 
controls to buffer the effects of collective strain and prevent the adoption of extremist 
attitudes. Conversely, mechanisms of moral and legal neutralization may work to 
minimize internal controls and amplify the effects of strain.  
 
THE CURRENT STUDY 
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This paper seeks to examine the effects of vicarious exposure to collective strain on 
support for violent extremism. Research suggests that collective strain generates negative 
emotions, such as anger, which in turn fosters support for violence used to alleviate the 
strain or “right” the perceived wrong. Although Agnew (2010) has outlined a clear 
theoretical framework, no study has yet empirically tested the direct and conditional 
effects of collective strain on support for violent extremism. This study begins to fill this 
gap by investigating the impact of vicarious collective strain on adolescents’ violent 
extremist attitudes in Zurich, Switzerland. Specifically, we explore two theoretical claims 
made by Agnew (2010): first, we examine the proposition that exposure to collective 
strain is associated with higher support for violent extremism. Given our current sample 
of native and second-generation immigrant adolescents in Zurich, we focus on the impact 
of vicarious collective strain on extremist beliefs. Second, we test the extent to which the 
effect of collective strain is conditional on inner controls, namely one’s perceptions of 
moral and legal constraints. While there are other possible conditional factors (e.g. 
disposition, personality, delinquent peers), we focus our study on moral and legal 
conditional effects based on the apparent importance of these factors in prior research on 
both crime and extremism (Aly et al. 2014; Bandura 1999; Hafez 2009; Hagan et al. 2016; 
Mazerolle and Maahs 2000; Rattner and Yagil 2004; Slootman and Tille 2006).  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
This study examines the direct and conditional effects of collective strain on adolescent 
support for violent extremism using data from two waves of the Zurich Project on the 
Social Development of Children and Youths (z-proso), an ongoing prospective 
longitudinal study on the development of aggressive and other problem behavior based 
on a cohort of children that entered 1 of 56 primary schools in the City of Zurich in 2004 
(see Eisner, Malti, and Ribeaud 2011). The initial sample of schools was randomly 
selected using a stratified random sampling procedure that slightly over-sampled school 
districts with a lower SES, resulting in 1,675 children from 56 primary schools (Eisner 
and Ribeaud 2005). This study comprises seven waves of child and youth interviews at 
ages 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, and 17. Until age 11, active parent consent was required. From 
wave 5 (age 13) on, the participating youths were legally old enough to give the active 
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consent to participate on their own, while their parents had the option to proscribe their 
child’s participation (passive consent). Also, at ages 13 and 15 the study team was entitled 
to re-contact the entire initial target sample. This allowed to increase the overall 
participation rate, specifically also among low-SES participants with an immigration 
background. 
Despite the slight overrepresentation of lower SES school districts, the study 
population is largely representative of the youth population of the city (but not of the 
country), with a very large proportion of youths with a migration background. 48.3% of 
the participants have two parents born abroad, 27.9% have one parent born in 
Switzerland and the other born abroad, and 23.8% have two parents born in Switzerland. 
With regard to the mother’s country of birth, 38.1% were born in Switzerland, 16.2% in 
former Yugoslavia, 6.0% were born in Sri Lanka, most of whom originating from the 
Tamil minority, 5.4% were born in Portugal, 5.4% in Germany, and 4.3% in Turkey. 
Among the remainder of the mothers, 8.1% were born in other Western countries (e.g., 
Italy, Spain, USA), 5.9% in other Asian countries (other than the former USSR), 4.9% 
were born in Latin America, 3.5% in Africa, and 2.3% in other East-European countries 
(including the former USSR). The distribution of the fathers’ country of birth is similar. 
As to the participants’ religious affiliation, 25.1% are Roman-Catholic, 21.6% are 
Protestant, 20.0% are Muslim, 18.9% have no religious affiliation, 7.6% are Christian-
Orthodox, 5.2% are Hindu, and 1.7% have another religious affiliation. 
The data used in the present paper was collected at ages 15 and 17 based on 
paper-and-pencil surveys that were carried out in public school classrooms during the 
participants’ leisure time. The survey sessions were guided by trained study staff and 
lasted for 90 minutes on average. The participants received an incentive worth 50 and 60 
USD, respectively.  
 Support for violent extremism was measured in wave 7 (age 17), whereas 
explanatory variables are drawn from wave 6 (age 15) or are retrospectively measured in 
wave 7 (ages 16-17) to distinguish the temporal order between predictors and outcome. 
The sample was restricted to all who participated in waves 6 and 7 (n=1,288), and for 
whom complete information was available, resulting in 1214 respondents.  
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Measures 
Violent extremist attitudes scale 
There is no consensus on how to best measure attitudes in support for violent extremism. 
Some studies have attempted to measure support for violent extremism with one single 
item, while other scales are developed to measure support for a particular extremist 
ideology or group. For example, In the 2009/10 UK Citizenship Survey, attitudes towards 
violent extremism were measured with four items, wherein each item measured approval 
of the use of violence for one specific political motivation such as “using violence to 
protect animals,” “encourage violence towards different ethnic groups,” or use “violent 
extremism, in the name of religion, to protest or achieve a goal” (Department for 
Communities and Local Government and Ipsos MORI 2011). In our view, the selective 
presentation of some, but not other motivations to use violence as well as the use of the 
term “violent extremism” in two out of the four questions limit the utility of the 
instrument.  
In light of these limitations, a new scale was developed for this study. The 
instrument aims to measure generic support for violent extremism defined as attitudes 
that “encourage, endorse, condone, justify, or support the commission of a violent 
criminal act to achieve political, ideological, religious, social, or economic goals” (ICAP 
2014). Four items were constructed so that each measures a different aspect of using 
violence for collective goals. This includes using violence to fight against injustice, to 
defend the values, convictions, or religious beliefs of a group, to support groups that use 
violence, and to fight for a better world by using violence, committing attacks or 
kidnapping people. 
Responses were given on a 4-point Likert scale that ranged from “fully untrue” 
(1) to “fully true” (4). The reliability was good with a Cronbach’s α of .80. The scale has a 
positive skew (.618) reflecting that a minority of young people endorse violent extremist 
attitudes. Table 1 reports the breakdown of responses on the Likert scale for each item. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Independent variables 
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Collective strain. There are many potential sources of collective strain, including political, 
cultural, and economic discrimination, systematic exclusion, and exposure to war and 
conflict. Notably, Agnew (2006, 2010) argues that strain (collective or individual) is likely 
to have the highest impact when it is high in magnitude, unjust, and chronic or persistent. 
Thus we operationalized collective strain in a way that aims to capture all of these 
characteristics, so as to maximize the likelihood of detecting an effect. An adolescent’s 
experience of collective strain was measured using an average of the 2010 to 2015 Fragile 
State Index (Fund for Peace [FFP], 2016), a composite score reflecting a country’s 
stability on 12 political, social, and economic indicators. The average index covers events 
and data for the years 2009 to 2014. To construct each indicator, a “mixed method” 
approach is used to collect, triangulate, and integrate data from online documents, 
quantitative databases, as well as qualitative input (Messner et al. 2015: 16). Social 
indicators include demographic pressures (e.g. natural disasters, population growth, water 
scarcity), refugees and internally displaced persons (e.g. displacement, refugee camps), 
group grievances (e.g. discrimination, powerlessness, ethnic, communal, or religious 
violence), and human flight and brain drain (e.g. migration per capita, emigration). 
Economic indicators include uneven economic development (e.g. GINI coefficient, slum 
population) and poverty and economic decline (e.g. economic deficit, unemployment, 
inflation). Political and military indicators include state legitimacy (e.g. corruption, 
government effectiveness, political participation), public services (e.g. provision of 
policing, education, and healthcare, criminality, literacy), human rights and rule of law 
(e.g. civil liberties, political freedoms, religious persecution, torture), security apparatus 
(e.g. internal conflict, riots and protests, coups, fatalities from conflict), factionalized elites 
(e.g. power struggles, flawed elections), and external intervention (e.g. presence of 
peacekeepers, foreign military intervention, sanctions). Taken together, the overall index 
reflects the degree to which residents of a country are exposed to significant collective 
strain, including discrimination, repression, exclusion, and conflict.  
Second generation immigrants may experience vicarious strain due to ongoing 
strife in their parent’s country of birth due to the magnitude, unjust nature, and often 
protracted length of the conflict or instability (Agnew 2002). In addition, collective strains 
are likely to affect these adolescents through their sense of shared identity with their 
national or ethnic background. As such, we assigned the relevant Fragile States Index 
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score according to adolescents’ parents’ country of origin. In cases where participants had 
parents from two different countries, we kept the highest score. This method ensures that 
we capture the highest possible exposure to collective strain. Scores ranged from 22.6 
(Switzerland) to 113.9 (Somalia). Figure 1 displays the distribution of Fragile States Index 
scores according to parental background. Given that the index is highly positively skewed, 
we constructed a binary variable to distinguish adolescents experiencing high levels of 
collective strain. Adolescents with a score equaling the median (55.1) or above are 
exposed to high levels of collective strain and are coded as 1. All others are coded as 0. 
Countries with scores over the median reflect a range of countries with histories of 
protracted conflict and civil war (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Sri Lanka), as well as countries vulnerable to instability, group conflicts, or insecurity (e.g. 
Turkey, Angola, Morocco). We expect that a higher score on the Fragile States Index 
indicates greater and more varied vicarious exposure to collective strain.  
  
[Figure 1 – distribution of FSI scores] 
 
Personal strain. In addition to collective strain, we include a composite measure of personal 
strain. In contrast to collective strain, personal strains are experienced on the individual 
level. According to Agnew (2006), these strains can include negative school experiences, 
negative encounters with the criminal justice system, violent victimization, death in the 
family, or family instability. Personal strain was measured using a summary score of 
negative life events measured retrospectively at wave 7, covering ages 15-17. The scale 
includes 10 events similar to those identified by Agnew as significant individual stressors 
(2006): received censure or punishment at school, repeated a grade, broke up with a 
significant other, parent lost their job, parent died, sibling died, stayed at a mental 
hospital, violent victimization, and negative encounter with police. The scale ranged from 
0 to 6 events. 
 
Moral neutralization. Moral neutralization or disengagement reflects cognitive processes and 
distortions by which deviant beliefs and behaviors become justifiable within one’s moral 
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landscape (Ribeaud and Eisner, 2010). Moral neutralization is measured using a 18-item 
scale derived from overlapping theoretical sources, including moral disengagement 
(Bandura et al., 1996), neutralization theory (Sykes and Matza 1957; Huizinga et al. 2003), 
and self-serving cognitive distortions (Barriga and Gibbs 1996). Four mechanisms of 
moral disengagement and neutralization are included in the scale: cognitive restructuring 
(8 items), blaming the victim (3 items), distorting negative impact (3 items), assuming the 
worst (2 items) and minimizing own agency (2 items). Agreement with each item is 
measured using a 4 point Likert scale. Moral neutralization was measured in wave 6 (age 
15; α=.89) 
 
Legal cynicism. Legal neutralization is measured using six legal cynicism items derived from 
Karstedt and Farrall (2006) and Sampson and Bartusch’s (1998) original scale. Items 
include “It is okay to do whatever you want as long as you don’t hurt anyone,” “Laws 
were made to be broken,” and “Sometimes it’s necessary to ignore rules and laws to do 
what you want.” Agreement with each item is measured using a 4 point Likert scale. Legal 
cynicism was measured in wave 6 (age 15) and is reliable (α = .72).  
 
Generalized trust. Generalized trust refers to the perception that unfamiliar others in society 
can be relied upon (Delhey et al. 2011; Smith 2010). An adolescent who generally trusts 
others is expected to be more attached and embedded in wider societal norms and 
relations. Generalized trust is measured using three items adapted from the World Values 
Survey Questionnaires.2 Participants were asked whether they agreed with the statements, 
“most people can be trusted,” “people usually try to help other people,” and “most 
people try to be fair” using a 4 point Likert-type scale. The scale was measured at wave 6 
(age 15). The reliability was good with a Cronbach’s α of .78.   
 
Parental involvement. Parental involvement reflects the extent to which parents are involved 
in an adolescent’s everyday life. Parenting items were adapted from the Alabama 
Parenting Questionnaire (Shelton, Frick, and Wootton 1996) and the Parenting Scale 
                                                          
2 Available online at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/index_html. 
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from the Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony (KFN). The scale consists of 
six items measuring how often a child’s parents engage with them and help with their 
problems on a scale from 1 “never” to 5 “very often”. Items include e.g. “your parents 
show interest in what you do” and “when you have problems, you can go to your 
parents.” Parental involvement was measured in wave 6 (age 15) and is reliable (α = .76).  
 
Conflict coping skills. Individuals who are able to competently cope with conflict and 
negative encounters or situations are less likely to be affected by collective or personal 
strain (Agnew 2006, 2010). Conflict coping skills is measured using 4 items. Agreement is 
measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “never” to “very often.” Items include 
“I listen very carefully so that there are no misunderstandings,” “I try to put myself in the 
position of the other person, to try and understand him/her,” and “I try to control my 
anger.” Conflict coping skills were measured in wave 6 (age 15, α = .71).   
 
Additional Measures 
 
We include a range of additional variables that bear on theoretically relevant domains, 
including personality and dispositional characteristics and social learning perspectives. 
Personality and dispositional characteristics, such as low self-control and prior aggression, 
reflect latent tendencies to support rule-breaking and antisocial behavior, including 
violent extremism (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990; Simi et al. 2016). Social learning 
perspectives contend that support for violent extremism and related behaviors must be 
learned from peers, family, or the media (Akers and Silverman 2004). Thus we include 
two sources from which adolescents can be exposed to crime and violence for imitation 
and adoption of beliefs: belonging to a deviant peer group and consumption of violent 
media. In addition, we control for three key socio-demographic characteristics: gender, 
socio-economic status, and religious denomination. 
 
Low self-control. Low self-control is measured using 10 items adapted from Grasmick et al. 
(1993), incorporating five subdimensions of self-control: impulsivity, self-centeredness, 
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risk-seeking, preference for physical activities, and short temper. Agreement was coded 
on a 4-point Likert scale, and is reliable (α = .75). Low self-control was measured in wave 
6 (age 15). 
 
Aggression. Aggression was measured using the relevant subscales of the Social Behavior 
Questionnaire [SBQ] (Tremblay et al. 1991). Three items refer to physical aggression (e.g., 
“you kicked, bit, or hit other people”), three items refer to proactive/instrumental 
aggression (e.g., “you threatened other people to get something from them”), and three 
items refer to reactive aggression (e.g., “you got very angry when someone teased or 
irritated you”). Item response were provided on a five point Likert scale from never to 
very often.  The reliability and validity of the SBQ has been supported in previous 
research (e.g., Tremblay et al. 1991; Tremblay et al., 1992). Overall aggression was 
measured at age 15, and has good reliability with a Cronbach’s α of .83.  
 
Deviant peer group. An adolescent’s exposure to deviant norms and delinquent peers was 
measured using a binary variable indicating whether or not an individual is a member of a 
deviant peer group in wave 6 (age 15). Those who identified as part of a deviant peer 
group were coded as 1, whereas those who identified as part of a non-deviant peer group 
or were not part of a group were coded as 0 (Mean=.21). 
 
Violent media consumption. Participants’ violent media consumption was measured with five 
items, including “watching horror movies suitable for ages 18 and older (18+)”, 
“watching thriller or action movies 18+”, “searching for, and watching violent content on 
the internet, watching videos with violent content on your cell phone, and sharing them 
with friends”, and “playing action-packed 18+ computer or video games, which contain 
intense and/or realistic portrayals of violence and killing (e.g. first person shooters)”. 
These items were derived from a scale developed by the KFN (Mössle et al. 2007) 
Questions were answered on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never) to 7 (daily). 
Violent media consumption was measured at age 15, and has good reliability 
(Chronbach’s α=.80).  
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Sociodemographic background. Three sociodemographic variables were included: gender, SES, 
and religious denomination. Gender was coded 0 for females and 1 for males 
(Mean=.50). SES was measured based on the primary caregiver’s current occupation, and 
the codes were transformed into an International Socioeconomic Index of occupational 
status (ISEI) score (Ganzenboom, de Graaf, and Treiman 1992). The ISEI scores reflect 
the relationship between education and income, with higher scores indicating higher SES. 
An adolescent’s SES score was based on the highest ISEI recorded for each household. If 
information from wave 6 was missing, we used the most recent high score from previous 
waves (Mean=49.82). Given the attention on Islamic violent extremism in recent years, 
we created a dummy variable for adolescents who identify as Muslim to examine whether 
this particular religious background is associated with higher support for violent 
extremism compared to other religious or non-religious backgrounds. Individuals who 
identified as Muslim (Sunni, Shiite, Alevi, Alawi) in wave 5 or 6 (age 13/15) were coded as 
1, whereas all other religious or non-religious backgrounds (i.e. Christian (Protestant, 
Catholic, or Orthodox), Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu, None) were coded as 0 (Mean=.19).   
 
Analytical Procedure 
 
This study uses ordinary least squares regression to examine the direct and conditional 
effects of collective strain on support for violent extremism. The analysis was conducted 
in two parts. First, we examined direct effects by regressing support for violent extremism 
on strain, moral and legal restraint variables, as well as additional and control measures. 
Second, conditional effects were tested by creating an interaction term for collective strain 
and moral disengagement and legal cynicism, respectively. Interactions were estimated 
and reported separately. Continuous interaction variables were centered at their means in 
order to facilitate the interpretation of the main effects. Due to heteroscedasticity, all 
models were estimated using robust standard errors.  
The percentage of missing values among the variables was low, with the highest 
number of missing values found for SES (3%, n=40). As such, all primary analyses were 
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conducted using listwise deletion. As a robustness check, full models were reestimated 
using multiple imputation (see Results section). 
 
RESULTS 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the descriptive characteristics and bivariate correlations for all 
study variables, respectively. The bivariate relationship between collective strain and 
support for violent extremism is somewhat low (r = .13, p<.001). The strongest correlates 
of support for violent extremism are moral neutralization (r = .43, p<.001), consumption 
of violent media (r = .34, p<.001), and aggressive behavior (r = .31, p<.001). Exposure to 
collective strain is, albeit weakly, associated with higher moral neutralization (r = .18, 
p<.001), lower generalized trust (r = -.10, p<.001), lower parental involvement (r = -.22, 
p<.001), lower coping skills (r = -.09, p<.01), and higher levels of aggressive behavior (r = 
.17, p<.001).  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
 In order to examine direct effects, we estimated three regression models. Table 3 
presents the standardized coefficients (β), t values, and significance levels for each 
coefficient. The first model estimates the relationship between personal and collective 
strain and support for violent extremism, excluding all other study variables. Model 2 
incorporates moral and legal neutralization variables, and Model 3 estimates the effects of 
key variables independent of social, dispositional, and socio-demographic factors. 
Model 1 shows that both personal (β=.13, p<.001) and collective strain (β =.12, 
p<.001) are associated with significantly higher support for violent extremism. However 
the proportion of variance explained is small at 3 percent. In Model 2, adolescents who 
espouse high levels of moral neutralization (β =.36, p<.001) and legal cynicism (β =.09, 
p<.01) were significantly more likely to support violent extremism. With the addition of 
moral and legal neutralization, the model explained 19 percent of the variance in violent 
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extremist attitudes. When controls were added in Model 3, the relationship between 
collective strain and violent extremist attitudes dropped to non-significance, whereas the 
strongest predictor remained moral neutralization (β =.25, p<.001). However, most social, 
dispositional, and socio-demographic characteristics were not significantly related to 
violent extremist attitudes. Notably, those who reported competent coping skills were less 
likely to support violent extremism (β =-.09, p<.01) and, in line with broader research on 
violence, males were more likely than females to support violent extremism (β = .15, 
p<.001). The full model explained 24 percent of the variance. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Next, we examined the conditioning influences of moral and legal constraints on 
the relationship between collective strain and support for violent extremism. Table 4 
presents the results separately for each interaction term. Model 4 tests the conditional 
influence of moral neutralization on collective strain. The significant interaction term 
indicates that the effect of collective strain depends on the degree to which adolescents 
employ cognitive techniques to neutralize moral constraints against the use of violence (β 
=.07, p<.05). To interpret the effect, we estimated the marginal means for support for 
violent extremism by exposure to collective strain and level of moral neutralization 
holding all other variables at their means, and plotted the values (see Figure 2). Figure 2 
illustrates that the effect of collective strain is highest at high levels of moral 
neutralization: the estimate of the slope under conditions of high collective strain is .39 
(p<.001), and .26 (p<.001) under conditions of low collective strain. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Model 5 shows that legal cynicism conditions the effect of collective strain on 
violent extremist attitudes (β = .09, p<.05). Again, we explored the marginal means for 
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support for violent extremism by the interaction variables while holding all other variables 
at their means. Figure 3 shows that at low levels of legal cynicism, there is little difference 
in attitudes about violent extremism between adolescents exposed to high or low levels of 
collective strain. However, high levels of legal cynicism amplify the effect of collective 
strain on support for violent extremism. That is, adolescents exposed to high collective 
strain and who hold cynical attitudes towards the law are more susceptible to violent 
extremist attitudes than those who have not experienced such strain, but who are 
comparably cynical. The estimate of the slope under conditions of high collective strain is 
significant and positive at .21 (p<.001), whereas the slope for low collective strain is non-
significant at .06 (p=.28).  
 
[Figure 3 here] 
  
 In order to assess whether the results were affected by listwise deletion, values for 
SES were imputed using the remaining variables in the analysis and the regression-based 
multiple imputation technique. The full models (models 3, 4, and 5) were reestimated 
using imputed values for SES (n=1,249). Substantive results (not shown, but available 
from the authors by request) for Models 3 (direct effects) and 5 (conditional effects of 
legal cynicism) remained the same. However, upon reestimation using imputed values for 
Model 4 (conditional effects of moral neutralization), the coefficient for the interaction 
term dropped to non-significance (b = .13, p = .057). This suggests that results for 
conditional effects regarding moral neutralization were sensitive to the inclusion of cases 
for which SES information was missing.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The results show that collective strain is associated with a marginal increase in support for 
violent extremism, however this effect disappears when other social and individual 
variables are included in the model. Males, those with high levels of moral and legal 
neutralization, and those with poor coping skills are more likely to support violent 
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extremism. The results for conditioning influences suggest that the degree to which 
individuals neutralize moral and legal constraints amplifies the impact of collective strain 
on violent extremist attitudes. However, the results for the conditioning influence of 
moral neutralization were not robust.  
 Specifically, our results shed light on the direct, indirect, and conditional effects of 
strain on support for violent extremism among adolescents, as well as predictors of 
support more broadly. First, vicarious collective strain does not have a direct effect on 
support for violent extremism once other variables are controlled. This is generally in line 
with previous research that has found small direct or only indirect effects of strain on 
crime (see Agnew, 2006). Agnew (2006) argues that, in addition to generating negative 
emotions, exposure to strain can impact social, developmental, and situational variables 
that in turn affect deviant attitudes and behaviors. High levels of collective strain may 
therefore weaken internal moral controls, social bonds, and attachments and encourage 
adolescents to seek out negative peer relations or media. Prior research on radicalization 
processes and extremism has documented how collective, external experiences can affect 
family and social bonds and motivate extremist sympathy and activity (Pape 2005; Weine 
et al. 2009, but see Bhui et al. 2014).  
It is important to note that the impact of vicarious strain on negative emotions 
and coping responses depends on several factors, including proximity to the source of the 
strain, whether or not the strain has been resolved, and perceived contagiousness of the 
strain (Agnew 2002). In relation to collective strain, the most important factor is perhaps 
the degree to which individuals identify with the affected collectivity. In other words, 
adolescents who do not readily identify with their parents’ ethnic or national background 
are unlikely to be adversely affected by the ongoing civil strife. Given that we were not 
able to include a measure of self-perceived ethnic or national identity, the average effect 
of collective strain may be underestimated. Further research is needed to determine the 
extent to which self-identification moderates the relationship between collective strain 
and support for violent extremism.  
 In addition, the results revealed that support for violent extremism is strongly 
associated with low moral and legal constraints. Adolescents who justify the use of 
violence more generally and who dismiss the “bindingness” and legitimacy of the law are 
23 
 
more likely to support the use of violence to achieve political, social, or other ideological 
goals. This finding contributes to the growing body of theoretical and empirical research 
suggesting that disengagement from moral and legal norms is an important social-
psychological process that precedes and facilitates the adoption of extremist beliefs (Aly 
et al. 2014; Bandura 1986; Kruglanski and Fishman 2006; LaFree and Ackerman 2009; 
Pauwels and De Waele 2014; Schils and Pauwels 2014; Slootman and Tille 2006). We 
argue that such processes are cognitive “tools” used by actors to overcome conventional 
moral standards on the use of violence and legitimacy of legal institutions. As such, 
criminological knowledge on moral and legal neutralization more generally as part of a 
process of moral and legal socialization can contribute to our understanding of support 
for violent extremism (Fagan and Tyler 2005).  
For example, social learning perspectives can shed light on the mechanisms by 
which individuals acquire deviant and violent extremist beliefs (Akers and Silverman 
2004; Hagan et al. 1995; Huesmann et al. in press). Applying social learning theory to 
terrorism, Akers and Silverman (2004: 27) state:  
 
As part of their subcultural identities, terrorists learn an ideology that the ends 
justify the means; violence for political ends is accepted and rewarded. These 
function as definitions favorable to violence. […] In essence, the “framing” of the 
conflict teaches the terrorists definitions of the situation and when, where, and 
how often, it is morally right or justified to engage in political violence.  
 
In addition, social media is considered to be a source in which these learning mechanisms 
operate in regard to both traditional crime and violent extremism (Decker and Pyrooz 
2011; Pauwels and Schils 2016). Notably, research on radicalization and pathways into 
violent extremism reveal that political or ideological motivations are not necessarily 
prerequisites for differential association with extremist groups and the adoption of pro-
violent beliefs (Gill et al. 2014; Simi et al. 2016). Simi and colleagues (2016: 15) found that 
“the importance of ideology primarily follows rather than precedes entry” into violent 
extremist groups, and that initial contact and involvement was based on existing informal 
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(nonideological) criminal networks (see also Freilich et al. 1999; Horgan 2009; 
McGilloway et al. 2015; Schafer et al. 2014: 176). Thus, while we did not find a direct 
effect of belonging to a deviant peer group or violent media consumption on support for 
violent extremism, it is likely that these factors work indirectly to influence the 
justification of violence and neutralization of legal norms more generally.  
 Finally, a key tenant of GST states that not all of those who experience strain 
respond with anger and violence, and that there are certain conditions under which 
violence is more likely to result from experiences of strain (Mazerolle and Piquero 1997). 
In particular, an individual’s internal controls are important to regulating responses to 
strain and shaping the pathways with which to cope (Wikström and Bouhana in press). 
Consistent with this perspective (Angew et al. 2002; Mazerolle and Maahs 2000; 
Mazerolle and Piquero 1997), we find that low moral and legal constraints, as 
operationalized here by moral neutralization and legal cynicism, condition the effect of 
collective strain on support for violent extremism. In other words, adolescents who 
employed cognitive distortions to neutralize their moral beliefs and deny the 
“bindingness” of the law were more likely to respond to collective strain with violent 
extremist attitudes. Those who already espouse justifications for violence and rule-
breaking are more vulnerable to extremist violent pathways, particularly when vicariously 
exposed to conditions of collective social and economic strife, conflict, and repression. 
 Furthermore, Kirk and Matsuda (2011; see also Kirk and Papachristos 2011) 
argue that legal cynicism stems from social alienation, perceived injustice, and experiences 
of misconduct and harassment by criminal justice agents. Thus we may interpret the 
result as an indication that an individual’s perceived embeddedness and attachment to 
social and legal institutions can buffer the negative effects of collective strain and prevent 
the adoption of violent extremist attitudes. As adolescents encounter persistent injustices 
their cynicism increases and perceptions of the legitimacy of the law diminish, 
subsequently increasing susceptibility to violent extremist attitudes. This risk is 
particularly heightened for those experiencing collective strain.   
 
Limitations and Future Research 
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There are notable strengths to this study. First, it is one of few studies on violent 
extremism that examines theoretically relevant putative mechanisms predictive of 
extremist pro-violence attitudes using a representative sample of adolescents. This study 
includes a wide range of indicators from relevant theoretical frameworks such as social 
bonds and control, personality characteristics and predispositions, and social learning 
perspectives. Second, to our best knowledge this is currently the only study that uses 
prospective longitudinal data to examine support for violent extremism, allowing for the 
plausible distinction of temporal order between predictors and the outcome.  
This study also has several limitations. First, while the Fragile States Index is a 
reflection of the cumulative exposure to ongoing collective strife in a parent’s country of 
birth and therefore a plausible proxy for vicarious strain, the validity of this claim relies 
on the assumptions that adolescents are first knowledgeable about the presence of 
collective strain and second identify with their affected ethnic or national background. 
Furthermore, the FSI is a country-level indicator that may only partially capture parents’ 
and their children’s lived experiences of collective strain. In order to address these 
limitations, future studies should include a measure of self-identification, and adapt 
Agnew’s (2002) measures of experienced, vicarious, and anticipated victimization to 
capture subjective and objective exposure to collective strains, such as group 
discrimination, repression, injustice, and physical victimization.  
 Second, this study did not formally analyze the mediating mechanisms according 
to GST (Agnew 2006), and therefore provides only suggestive evidence that collective 
strain indirectly affects support for violent extremism. Most notably, we were not able to 
assess the mediating role of negative emotions, in particular anger, in generating support 
for extremist violence. Previous research suggests that anger is a strong justification and 
motivator for violence (Agnew 1992; Mazerolle and Piquero 1997; Mazerolle et al. 2003). 
Collective strain may affect negative emotions like anger on two dimensions: prolonged 
exposure to collective strain can lead to the development of negative emotional traits, 
which reflect one’s propensity to react to stressful situations in a negative way, and/or 
exposure to collective strain can generate negative emotional states, which reflects the 
experience of an emotion (Agnew 2006). For example, collective strain such as exposure 
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to conflict has been shown to adversely affect a child’s emotional traits and coping skills 
both directly (e.g. by increasing anxiety, stress, and normalizing violence) and indirectly 
(e.g. by generating family stress and poor maternal health, increasing the risk of child 
psychological and behavioral problems) (Merrilees et al. 2011; Muldoon 2013). In order to 
distinguish the mediating effects of negative emotional traits compared to emotional 
states, Agnew (2006) recommends the use of vignettes. Vignettes can portray a range of 
potential situations and sources of collective strain while measuring respondents’ 
emotional reactions and subsequent responses to cope with the strain.  
Finally, the measure of support for violent extremism used here was designed to 
measure a general support for violence to achieve political, ideological, religious, social, or 
economic goals. It did not measure support for specific violent ideologies or the extent to 
which subjects may personally consider engaging in extremist activities. It is now widely 
recognized that the relationship between attitudes and actual behaviors is complex, 
influenced by a variety of intermediary processes, and that only a small minority with 
extremist attitudes engages in violent extremist behaviors. Future studies should 
incorporate items that measure support for specific extremist movements as well as 
measures of action intent. 
This study has important implications for practitioners and policymakers aiming 
to understand and minimize sympathy for violent extremist behaviors. First, it is 
important to note that vicarious exposure to collective strain itself has no direct impact 
on violent extremist attitudes, and the strongest risk factors are reflected in a general 
tendency to minimize and disengage from moral and legal norms. Thus policymakers 
aiming to reduce or prevent support for extremism should implement universal programs 
that focus on legal socialization, or the process by which children develop normative 
beliefs about the law and legal authorities (Fagan and Tyler, 2005; Nivette et al., 2015). As 
such, support for violent extremism may be prevented by early childhood development of 
internal controls and promoting embeddedness and trust in legal institutions (Fagan and 
Tyler, 2005; Kirk and Papachristos, 2011). Furthermore, the potential strain-inducing 
effects of exposure to conflict, repression, and war can be significantly minimized by 
stimulating these same moral and legal control mechanisms. 
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Table 1 – Percentage of respondents agreeing with statements supporting violent extremism  
 
Item 
Fully 
untrue 
Somewhat 
untrue 
Somewhat 
true 
Fully 
true 
It’s sometimes necessary to use 
violence to fight against things 
that are very unjust 
29.5% 36.3% 27.8% 6.3% 
Sometimes people have to resort 
to violence to defend their 
values, convictions, or religious 
beliefs. 
44.0% 31.5% 19.8% 4.8% 
It's OK to support groups that 
use violence to fight injustices. 
43.0% 33.1% 19.7% 4.2% 
It's sometimes necessary to 
use violence, commit attacks or 
kidnap people to fight for a 
better world. 
65.2% 22.8% 9.7% 2.3% 
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Table 2 – Means and standard deviations for all variables in the analysis (n=1,214). 
  
Mean  SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Violent extremist attitudes 1.81 0.67 1                             
2 Personal strain 0.83 0.99 .13*** 1 
             
3 Collective strain (1=High) 0.48 0.50 .13*** .06* 1 
            
4 Moral neutralization 2.06 0.51 .43*** .19*** .18*** 1 
           
5 Legal cynicism 2.19 0.55 .30*** .18*** .05 .53*** 1 
          
6 Generalized trust 2.43 0.58 -.08** -.16*** -.10*** -.18*** -.16*** 1 
         
7 Parental involvement 3.02 0.62 -.18*** -.09** -.22*** -.29*** -.26*** .17*** 1 
        
8 Coping skills 3.37 0.80 -.22*** -.09** -.09** -.31*** -.26*** .14*** .22*** 1 
       
9 Low self-control 2.27 0.43 .21*** .22*** .02 .49*** .51*** -.20*** -.23*** -.38*** 1 
      
10 Aggression 1.67 0.54 .31*** .20*** .17*** .60*** .41*** -.17*** -.27*** -.35*** .49*** 1 
     
11 Deviant peer group (1=Yes) 0.21 0.41 .17*** .20*** -.05 .24*** .29*** -.05 -.07* -.10*** .25*** .26*** 1 
    
12 Violent media consumption 2.30 1.19 .34*** .23*** .10*** .51*** .31*** -.15*** -.18*** -.23*** .32*** .45*** .30*** 1 
   
13 Gender (1=Male) 0.50 0.50 .29*** .08** -.03 .34*** .11*** .03 -.10*** -.09** .08** .21*** .15*** .62*** 1 
  
14 SES 49.82 19.17 -.11*** -.01 -.37*** -.14*** -.04 .04 .23*** .16*** -.04 -.15*** .09** -.12*** .05 1 
 
15 Religion (1=Muslim) 0.19 0.39 .09** -.06* .49*** .15*** .00 -.09*** -.13*** -.05 .04 .13*** -.06* .06* -.05 -.33*** 1 
Notes. SD = standard deviation; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table 3 – Ordinary least squares regression of support for violent extremism (age 17) on strain, moral and legal neutralization, and control 
variables (ages 15-17) (n = 1,214). 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  β t-value β t-value β t-value 
Personal strain .13*** 4.09 .04 1.55 .04 1.21 
Collective strain (1=High) .12*** 4.31 .06* 2.19 .04 1.31 
Moral neutralization   .36*** 10.64 .25*** 6.25 
Legal cynicism   .09** 2.82 .11** 3.04 
       
Generalized trust     .01 0.29 
Parental involvement     -.02 -0.78 
Coping skills     -.09** -2.97 
Low self-control     -.06 -1.74 
Aggression     .03 0.78 
Deviant peer group (1=Yes)     .04 1.33 
Violent media consumption     .04 0.94 
Gender (1=Male)     .15*** 4.42 
SES     -.04 -1.30 
Religion (1=Muslim)     .02 0.59 
Constant 1.66*** 58.64 0.53*** 6.41 1.16*** 4.99 
F-value 19.47***  67.28***  27.08***  
R2 .03  .19  .24  
Notes. All models are estimated using robust standard errors. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 
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Table 4 – Conditional effects of moral and legal constraints on the effect of collective strain (n=1,214). 
 
 
Model 4 Model 5 
  β t-value β t-value 
Personal strain .03 1.20 .04 1.24 
Collective strain (1=High) .04 1.38 .04 1.26 
Moral neutralization .20*** 4.36 .25*** 6.30 
Legal cynicism .11** 3.10 .05 1.09 
Collective strain x Moral neutralization .07* 1.99   
Collective strain x Legal cynicism   .09* 2.35 
     
Generalized trust .01 0.25 .004 0.15 
Parental involvement -.02 -0.78 -.02 -0.83 
Coping skills -.09** -3.05 -.09** -3.06 
Low self-control -.06 -1.75 -.07 -1.83 
Aggression .03 0.67 .02 0.56 
Deviant peer group (1=Yes) .04 1.48 .04 1.51 
Violent media consumption .04 0.89 .04 0.87 
Gender (1=Male) .15*** 4.55 .15*** 4.48 
SES -.04 -1.38 -.04 -1.31 
Religion (1=Muslim) .02 0.48 .02 0.70 
Constant 1.85*** 7.63 1.49*** 6.25 
F-value 25.63***  25.59***  
R2 .24  .24  
Notes. All models are estimated using robust standard errors. Moral neutralization and legal cynicism are 
mean centered. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 
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Figure 1 – Frequency of Fragile States Index (2015) scores matched to parent country of origin 
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Figure 2 – Estimated support for violent extremism by level of moral neutralization and exposure to collective strain 
 
 
 
 
  
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
V
io
le
n
t 
e
x
tr
e
m
is
t 
a
tt
it
u
d
e
s 
(p
re
d
ic
te
d
)
Moral neutralization
High collective
strain
Low collective
strain
39 
 
Figure 3 – Estimated support for violent extremism by level of legal cynicism and exposure to collective strain 
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